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A FIA-appointed panel’s examination into Jules Bianchi’s deadly crash during the Japanese Grand Prix revealed that human error was the primary contributor to the mishap.The accident was not brought about by a single, unrelated incident but rather by a series of circumstances that might have helped.The reports’ conclusions indicate that there is no single reason.

A weather system that was going through the region ahead of a typhoon caused very mixed conditions toward the end of the Japanese Grand Prix, and there was a semi-dry racing line in the section of the course known as the “S Curves.”

The Sauber driver, Adrian Sutil, ran into this rushing water and lost control of his car.

Adrian Sutil, the Sauber driver, struck this moving water and lost control of his vehicle, which crashed into the retaining wall as it came around the curve.Sutil was unharmed, however he was eliminated from the race.

In accordance with usual protocol, a recovery vehicle, or “snatch tractor,” was dispatched to pick up the damaged Sauber and relocate it to a secure location behind the wall.

Additionally, marshals were stationed trackside to clean the area of trash, fix the barrier, and aid in recovering Sutil’s damaged vehicle.Yellow flags that were double waved were exhibited to both safeguard the course staff and alert oncoming traffic to potential danger.

Drivers ought to slow down and be prepared to stop if required.

Drivers should reduce their speed and be ready to stop if necessary when they see these flags.It is not permitted to overtake.One lap later, Jules Bianchi, who had been just ahead of Sutil when the Sauber driver crashed, returned to the track in his Marussia MR03.

Because Sutil’s car was being recovered at this time, he was shown the double-waved yellow flags.

Bianchi did not slow down enough in front of the double-waved yellow flags for reasons that may never become obvious and have already been discussed elsewhere.

It is obvious that an accident might still have been averted from this point forward, or at the very least, its severity could have been lessened.

Only a little over a minute and a half ago, Sutil had lost control of the vehicle.

Sutil had lost control of the car just over a minute and a half earlier, and Bianchi experienced the same fate when the Marussia arrived on the same stretch of water.The car, which had lost rear grip, was overcorrected by the French driver, who caused the vehicle to go straight off the track and toward the location of the recovery effort.

By this point, a collision was inevitable; the only remaining question was what and how hard Marussia would strike.There was still time to avoid the rescue vehicle during the 2 seconds it took Bianchi’s car to leave the track and cross the run-off area, so he made the effort.

For some reason, he also used the throttle. However, applying the brake locked the front wheels, making it impossible for him to steer (it is not clear if the throttle was already applied from the reports findings, but it probably was and Bianchi simply did not lift).

Given that all 2014 F1 vehicles feature a backup safety system called FailSafe, in this case the engine should have been cut out. On the custom Marussia brake by wire (BBW) rear brake design, another sub system, the Torque Coordinator, which controls the operation of the BBW, prevented it from doing so. This software algorithm in the car’s onboard computer is intended to override the throttle and cut the engine in precisely this situation.

This system failure is highlighted in the paper.

The study emphasizes this system failure but notes that while the engine torque sought by the driver was not canceled out by FailSafe and may have altered the impact velocity, this cannot be accurately quantified.However, it’s possible that Bianchi was unable to move the car to avoid hitting the crane because he was preoccupied with what was occurring and the fact that his front wheels were locked.

The accident might have been prevented or its severity could have been lessened if Bianchi had slowed down sufficiently for the double waved yellows, had not overcorrected the car’s handling, and had lifted off in the final two seconds before impact.

With little braking, Bianchi’s car struck the engine cover and left rear wheel of the 6.5 (metric) tonne recovery vehicle.The roll hoop and air box were torn off of his composite chassis car, and the Frenchman’s helmet was struck.

He suffered significant injuries as a result of the force of the strike and its glancing nature, which resulted in a massive head deceleration and angular acceleration.”It is not practical to either enclose the driver’s cockpit or equip the crane with skirts in order to lessen the injuries Bianchi sustained.Due to the enormous forces involved in the collision between a 700 kg automobile and a 6 500 kg crane traveling at a speed of 126 kph, neither strategy is workable.After a protracted recovery from head injuries sustained in a head-on crash at the Japanese Grand Prix in October 2014, Bianchi passed away in July of last year.He was 25.

When the Marussia driven by Bianchi left the track

When Bianchi’s Marussia car went off the track and struck a crane lifting up the Sauber of German driver Adrian Sutil, who had crashed at the same position one lap earlier, it was the last lap of the race in rainy, dreary circumstances.

To absorb the energy of such a hit without shattering the driver’s survival cell or producing non-survivable decelerations, an F1 car simply does not have enough impact structure.

Making a collision between a racing car and a big, heavy vehicle survivable is regarded as inherently incorrect.It is essential to avoid having an automobile ever strike the crane or the nearby marshals who are on duty.The safety car should have been launched while Sutil’s car’s wreckage was being removed, according to several publications and websites, but the study disagrees.

Driving directions under a double yellow flag should be followed

“The responses to Sutil’s accident were in line with the rules and how they had been interpreted in the eight years prior after 384 accidents.There isn’t a clear reason why the Safety Car should have been used either before or after Sutil’s crash without the benefit of hindsight.

Drivers should obey double yellow flag instructions so that neither competitors nor officials are put in immediate or physical risk.Numerous recommendations were made in the report, some of which have already been carried out.

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